Individuelle Lebensordnung und Weltbezug. Die Frage nach der Ordnung des „Guten Lebens“ in Schelers <i>Ordo Amoris</i>


  • Günter Fröhlich



Weltordnung, Wertordnung, Lebensordnung


The notion that there are ordering structures in the world was first developed in an­cient Greek thought. This notion of ordering structures can be found in the epics of Homer and Hesiod, in the Greek lyricists, and in the Attic dramas, and it is transformed and reformulated through the philosophical reflections starting with Heraclitus and ending with Aristotle. As a consequence, the region for which an ordering is possible becomes ever broader. Initially, this region was the world and its origination, but then it grew to include human beings and their thoughts, feelings and actions. Not only were orderings considered to be already present in the world, but the human being was placed in the position to emulate and bring them about. Yet, the very possibility of dynamic representations of ordering is called into question by the possible reconstruction of ordering and by the possible inner transformation that can take place through action and the reshaping of the world. If a system is established by the representation of an ordering, would not any transformation disturb the ordering? It is in particular this old question that is raised anew when Max Scheler introduces his concept of ordering, an ordo amoris: how can education, edification, action, responsibility, etc., be possible, if perception or value-ception, intentional acts that the individual executes and that establish the foundational order, have a rigid foundational order? This problem directly concerns the concept of norms and their relation to the representation of ordering. A further problem arises thereby in Scheler when the relation between the objective measures of a binding ordo amoris, which determines the value goodness of every possible striving, and the subjective framework of the individual order of preference is called into question.