L'identità personale in David Hume: dalle passioni all'etica

Lorenzo Greco


Personal Identity in David Hume: From Passions to Ethics

In this paper I offer a reconstruction of David Hume’s discussion of personal identity. I argue that, notwithstanding Hume’s description of personal identity in Book 1 of A Treatise of Human Nature in terms of a «bundle of perceptions», he is nevertheless in a position to present a unified conception of the self. This becomes apparent when he moves on to Books 2 and 3 of the same Treatise to talk about the passions of pride and humility. I conclude by suggesting that by putting weight on these passions Hume can arrive at a definition of the self that finds its completion in the ethical dimension.


Lorenzo Greco; David Hume; personal identity

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.13136/thau.v2i0.26

DOI (PDF): http://dx.doi.org/10.13136/thau.v2i0.26.g27


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