Aisthesis come “scienza del particolare”: la sensazione nel De anima di Aristotele

Abstract

This paper aims to explore the theory of sensation explained by Aristotle in the second book of De anima, also studying topics related to his gnosiological foundations, as they are shown in the explanatory and ontological scheme of act and potency.

A reference methodological context sets De anima among Aristotelian physical works. It also underlines the specific value that both sensation and most of all phenomena assume in evaluating the Aristotelian physical science.

Starting from this context the analysis develops in three steps:

1. searching a definition of the process of “having sensation” that is explained as a potency that becomes act, but needs some terminological and conceptual clarifications about words like act, potency and undergoing;
2. finding role of the sensible object in the process of aisthesis;
3. mentioning necessity of the medium in the sensation.