La natura delle cose singolari in Spinoza
Keywords:nominalism, individual essence, knowledge of the third kind, extrinsic denominations, singularity
To consider Spinoza a nominalist is a commonplace widespread among scholars. Nevertheless, it is wrong. Not just because Spinoza is without a doubt a realist with regard to a certain sort of universal notions (attributes, for example), but also because the essences of finite modes (res particulares or singulares) are not reducible to individual essences. The thesis I would like to support in this paper is this: the essences of finite modes are neither general nor individual, but “singular”.
Copyright (c) 2022 Paolo Godani
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