Conoscenza e felicità nell’etica socratico-platonica

il caso dell’Ippia Minore

Abstract

Knowledge and happiness in Socratic-Platonic ethics: the case of Hippias Minor

This essay is based on the assumption that ancient philosophy is still interesting for us as much as we get rid of modern prejudices and are willing to take into consideration opinions considerably different from the most widespread modern ideas. The objects of the inquiry are the so-called paradoxes of Socratic-Platonic ethics (virtue is knowledge, vice is ignorance, no one does evil voluntarily), all in various ways dependent on the fact that Plato believed that ethics was a technique. The first part of the article sets out the general reasons why Plato maintained such identification. The second part takes into consideration the Hippias Minor (in particular the last pages), namely the dialogue in which, according to some interpreters, Plato intends to show that ethics cannot be reduced to a technique. The author aims to show that this hypothesis is incorrect: what Plato is doing with this dialogue is, in fact, to prove that the differences between ethics and other techniques do not prejudice the fact that ethics too is a technique.